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    Judgments-Index

    • Macquarie Bank Limited  Vs. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd.- Civil Appeal No.15135 Of 2017- SC- 15.12.2017- Corporate, Business & Commercial Law- Operational Creditor- Operational Debt- Corporate Debtor- Demand Notice By Lawyer, Chartered Accountant Or A Company Secretary- Insolvency Proceedings- Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code, 2016- S-9(3)(C)- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016- National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) [Full Pdf Judgment].
    • Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra-DelHC-17.02.2017- MAT.APP.(F.C.) 67 Of 2016- custody, including interim custody and visitation rights- Mediation- Mediator- Conciliation- Counselor- Counselor’s Report- How far confidential and/or debatable during trials- The Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Rules, 2004- The Conciliation Rules of United Nations Commission On International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)- Section 12 of the Family Courts Act, 1984- Uniform Mediation Act (USA), 2003- Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Rules, 1999-Code for Practice for Mediators issued by the Family Mediation Council, England and Wales- Guidelines issued by Family Justice Courts, Singapore-Members Code of Professional Conduct issued by Family Mediation, Canada-Mediation Training Manual issued by the Supreme Court of India [Full PDF Original Judgment-17.02.2017] [Full PDF Review Judgment-11.12.2017].
    • Madhu Limaye Vs. Not Known-Writ Petition No. 355 Of 1968-SC-18.12.1968- Criminal Law-Arrest And Detention [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Madhu Limaye-  Writ Petition No. 307 Of 1970- SC-10.09.1970- [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Madhu Limaye Vs Ved Murti- Writ Petition No. 307 Of 1970- SC-28.10.1970- Arrest And Detention- Quashing- Cr.P.C.-S-144 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Madhu Limaye Vs. SDM, Monghyr-SC-28.10.1970- [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Madhu Limaye-Criminal Appeal No. 81 Of 1977- SC-31.10.1977- Crpc- S-397(2) [Full PDF Judgments],
    • Madhuri Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Debobroto Dutta & Anr. - Civil Appeal No.10742 Of 2016 - SC- 09.11.2016 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Madras Bar Association Versus Union Of India- Writ Petition (C) NO. 1072 OF 2013- 5JBSC-14.05.2015- (2015) 8 SCC 583- AIR 2015 SC 1571- Challenge to the constitutional validity of creation of National Company Law Tribunal ('NCLT' for short) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ('NCLAT' for short) [Full PDF Judgment]
    • Madras Petrochem Ltd. & Anr. Versus BIFR & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos.-614-615 OF 2016, Judgment Dated: 29.01.2016, Bench: Kurian Joseph & R.F. Nariman, JJ, Supreme Court OF India- - Banking & Finance- SARFAESI Act- Held, “54. The resultant position may be stated thus: 1. Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will continue to apply in the case of unsecured creditors seeking to recover their debts from a sick industrial company. This is for the reason that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 overrides the provisions of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 2. Where a secured creditor of a sick industrial company seeks to recover its debt in the manner provided by Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, such secured creditor may realise such secured debt under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 3. In a situation where there are more than one secured creditor of a sick industrial company or it has been jointly financed by secured creditors, and at least 60 per cent of such secured creditors in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date do not agree upon exercise of the right to realise their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will continue to have full play. 4. Where, under Section 13(9) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, in the case of a sick industrial company having more than one secured creditor or being jointly financed by secured creditors representing 60 per cent or more in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date wish to exercise their rights to enforce their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, being inconsistent with the exercise of such rights, will have no play. 5. Where secured creditors representing not less than 75 per cent in value of the amount outstanding against financial assistance decide to enforce their security under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, any reference pending under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 cannot be proceeded with further – the proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 will abate. 55. In conclusion, it is held that the interim order dated 17.1.2004 by the Delhi High Court would not have the effect of reviving the reference so as to thwart taking of any steps by the respondent creditors in this case under Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. This is because the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 prevails over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 to the extent of inconsistency therewith. Section 15(1) proviso 3 covers all references pending before the BIFR, no matter whether such reference is at the inquiry stage, scheme stage, or winding up stage. The Orissa High Court is not correct in its conclusion on the interpretation of Section 15(1) proviso 3 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. This being so, it is clear that in any case the present reference under Section 15(1) of the Appellant No.1 company has abated inasmuch as more than 3/4th of the secured creditors involved have taken steps under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The appeals are accordingly dismissed [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mahendra Singh  Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others- Writ Petition (PIL) No. 112 of 2015-UttHC-19.06.2018- Environment Law-  Issue, Multiple Pollutants & Contaminants- Sound Pollution- Air Pollution- Water Pollution- Discharge of industrial effluents- Untreated chemical waste- industrial waste- Untreated Hazardous waste [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mahesh Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India- SC-06.07.2009- Transferred Case (C) NO. 6 OF 2009-(2009) 8 SCC 273- Appointment- of a Judge- Held, there is vital difference between judicial review and merit review. Once there is consultation, the content of that consultation is beyond the scope of judicial review though lack of effective consultation could fall within the scope of judicial review [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Maheshwari Mandal (Delhi) Vs. The State Of Delhi- W.P. (C) 2029 of 2016- DelHC-03.01.018- Registrar of Society Cases- Societies Registration Act, 1860-S-12- The Act enabled a society to alter or amend its objects and purpose and did not extend to registering any amendment in Rules and Regulations of the society [Full PDFJudgment].
    • Major Singh Vs. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 1145/2012, Judgment Dated: 08/04/2015; Bench: T.S. Thakur, J.: R. Banumathi, J.: Amitava Roy, J.-  Citation: 2015(5) SCC 201: 2015(5) JT 435: 2015(4) SCALE 599: 2015(2) JCC 1385: 2015 AIR(SC) 2081: 2015(6) SLT 452.- Penal Code, 1860- Section 304-B- Acquittal- Lack of reasonable nexus between harassment and death, convition set aside- Appeal against judgment of High Court of whereby High Court confirmed conviction of appellants under Section 304B- During pendency of appeal before High Court, husband of deceased died and appeal against husband abated and appeal survived qua appellants viz., father-in-law and mother-in-law- Held, Karamjit Kaur died due to organo phosphorus poisoning within 21/2 years of marriage- However, fact that deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry not proved by prosecution- Both courts below acquitted all accused for offence punishable under Section 498A IPC- No evidence as to demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry harassment "soon before her death"- Conviction of appellants under Section 304B IPC is liable to be set aside- Appeal allowed.- Hira Lal & Ors. vs. State(Govt. of NCT) Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80; State of A.P. vs. Raj Gopal Asawa & Anr., (2004) 4 SCC 470; Balwant Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 724; Kaliyaperumal & Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157; Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388; Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC 463; Biswajit Halder @ Babu Halder & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 1 SCC 202 & Narayanamurthy vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 512, Relied on (Para 11, 13, 14, 17 & 18)- HELD: Prosecution has not examined any independent witness or the Panchayatdars to prove that there was demand of dowry and that the deceased was subjected to ill-treatment. Ordinarily, offences against married woman are being committed within the four corners of a house and normally direct evidence regarding cruelty or harassment on the woman by her husband or relatives of the husband is not available. But when PW3 has specifically stated that the demand of dowry by the accused was informed to the Panchayatdars and that Panchayat was taken to the village Badiala, the alleged ill-treatment or cruelty of Karamjit Kaur by her husband or relatives could have been proved by examination of the Panchayatdars. The fact that deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry is not proved by the prosecution. It is also pertinent to note that both the courts below have acquitted all the accused for the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC (Para 13)- Insofar as the occurrence on 14.08.1996, PWs 1 and 3 have stated that they saw the accused dragging Karamjit Kaur towards a room inside the house and that Karamjit Kaur was trembling and on seeing PWs 1 and 3, all the four accused persons ran away and after taking last breath Karamjit Kaur expired. Subsequent conduct of PWs 1 and 3 raises serious doubts about their presence in the house of the accused at the time of occurrence and witnessing accused dragging deceased-Karamjit Kaur. That PWs 1 and 3 have not raised any alarm nor tried to chase the accused and that PW1 did not inform anyone in the village of the accused looks quite unnatural. The subsequent conduct of PWs 1 and 3 raises doubt about their presence at the time of occurrence and the prosecution version. But the fact remains that deceased-Karamjit Kaur died within 21/2 years of marriage otherwise under normal circumstances. As pointed out earlier, in the cases of dowry death prosecution is obliged to show that "soon before the occurrence" deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment. In the absence of proof that deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment "soon before her death", the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained (Para 14)- There is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry harassment "soon before her death". Except the demand of scooter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in our view, it can only be attributed to the husband-Jagsir Singh who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. In the absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry "soon before her death" by the appellants, the conviction of the appellants under Section 304B IPC cannot be sustained. The trial court and the High Court have not analyzed the evidence in the light of the essential ingredients of Section 304B IPC and the conviction of the appellants under Section 304B IPC is liable to be set aside (Para 17) [Full PDF Judgments].
    • Makemytrip (India) Pvt Ltd Versus Union Of India & Ors, W.P.(C) 525 of 2016, Judgment Dated: 01.09.2016, Bench: S. Muralidhar & Vibhu Bakhru, JJ, Delhi  High Court- Issue, Challenge to the powers of the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGCEI) of arrest, investigation and assessment of service tax under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 ( ̳FA‘).- MakeMyTrip (India) Private Limited filed this Petition against Union of India ( ̳UOI‘) through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, [Respondent No. 1]; the Director, DGCEI, [Respondent No. 2]; The Additional Director General ( ̳ADG‘) and the Senior Intelligence Officer, DGCEI [Respondent No. 4]- Related provisions of law: Section 91 read with Section 89 of the FA and Section 9AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 ( ̳CE Act‘).- The Court examined and determined the legality of the DGCEI in proceeding to search the premises of the two Petitioners and then deciding to arrest senior officials of the two Petitioners.- The Court's findings and conclusions were as follows: “116. To summarise the conclusions in this judgment: (i) The scheme of the provisions of the Finance Act 1994 (FA), do not permit the DGCEI or for that matter the Service Tax Department (ST Department) to by-pass the procedure as set out in Section 73A (3) and (4) of the FA before going ahead with the arrest of a person under Sections 90 and 91 of the FA. The power of arrest is to be used with great circumspection and not casually. It is not to be straightway presumed by the DGCEI, without following the procedure under Section 73A (3) and (4) of the FA, that a person has collected service tax and retained such amount without depositing it to the credit of the Central Government. (ii) Where an assessee has been regularly filing service tax returns which have been accepted by the ST Department or which in any event have been examined by it, as in the case of the two Petitioners, without commencement of the process of adjudication of penalty under Section 83 A of the FA, another agency like the DGCEI cannot without an SCN or enquiry straightway go ahead to make an arrest merely on the suspicion of evasion of service tax or failure to deposit service tax that has been collected. Section 83 A of the FA which provides for adjudication of penalty provision mandates that there must be in the first place a determination that a person is "liable to a penalty", which cannot happen till there is in the first place a determination in terms of Section 72 or 73 or 73 A of the FA. (iii) For a Central Excise officer or an officer of the DGCEI duly empowered and authorised in that behalf to be satisfied that a person has committed an offence under Section 89 (1) (d) of the FA, it would require an enquiry to be conducted by giving an opportunity to the person sought to be arrested to explain the materials and circumstances gathered against such person, which according to the officer points to the commission of an offence. Specific to Section 89 (1) (d) of the FA, it has to be determined with some degree of certainty that a person has collected service tax but has failed to pay the amount so collected to the Central Government beyond the period of six months from the date on which such payment is due and further that the amount exceeds Rs. 50 lakhs (now enhanced to Rs. 1 crore).  (iv) A possible exception could be where a person is shown to be a habitual evader of service tax. Such person would have to be one who has not filed a service tax return for a continuous length of time, who has a history of repeated defaults for which there have been fines, penalties imposed and prosecutions launched etc. That history can be gleaned only from past records of the ST Department. In such instances, it might be possible to justify resorting to the coercive provisions straightaway, but then the notes on file must offer a convincing justification for resorting to that extreme measure. (v) The decision to arrest a person must not be taken on whimsical grounds; it must be based on ̳credible material‘. The constitutional safeguards laid out in D K. Basu's case (supra) in the context of the powers of police officers under the Cr PC and of officers of central excise, customs and enforcement directorates, are applicable to the exercise of powers under the FA in equal measure. An officer whether of the Central Excise department or another agency like the DGCEI, authorised to exercise powers under the CE Act and/or the FA will have to be conscious of the constitutional limitations on the exercise of such power. (vi) In the case of MMT, without even an SCN being issued and without there being any determination of the amount of service tax arrears, the resort to the extreme coercive measure of arrest followed by the detention of Mr. Pallai was impermissible in law. (vii) In terms of CBEC's own procedures, for the launch of prosecution there has to be a determination that a person is a habitual offender. There is no such determination in any of these cases. There cannot be a habitual offender if there is no discussion by the DGCEI with the ST Department regarding the history of such Assessee. Assuming that, for whatever reasons, if the DGCEI does not talk to ST Department, certainly it needs to access the service tax record of such Assessee. Without even requisitioning that record, it could not have been possible for the DGCEI to arrive at a reasonable conclusion whether there was a deliberate attempt of evading payment of service tax. In the case of MMT, the decision to go in for the extreme step of arrest without issuing an SCN under Section 73 or 73A (3) of the FA, appears to be totally unwarranted. (viii) For the exercise of powers of search under Section 82 of the FA, (i) an opinion has to be formed by the Joint Commissioner or Additional Commissioner or other officers notified by the Board that ―any documents or books or things‖ which are useful for or relevant for any proceedings under this Chapter are secreted in any place, and (ii) the note preceding the search of a premises has to specify the above requirement of the law. The search of the premises of the two Petitioners is in clear violation of the mandate of Section 82 of the FA. It is unconstitutional and legally unsustainable. (ix) The Court is unable to accept that payment by the two Petitioners of alleged service tax arrears was voluntary. Consequently, the amount that was paid by the Petitioners as a result of the search of their premises by the DGCEI, without an adjudication much less an SCN, is required to be returned to them forthwith. (x) It was imperative for the DGCEI to first check whether the entity whose employees are sought to be arrested has regularly been filing service tax returns or is a habitual offender in that regard. It is only after checking the entire records and seeking clarification where necessary, that the investigating agency can possibly come to a conclusion that Section 89 (1) (d) is attracted. None of the above safeguards were observed in the present case. The DGCEI acted with undue haste and in a reckless manner. (xi) Liberty is granted to the officials of MMT and IBIBO to institute appropriate proceedings in accordance with law against the officers of the DGCEI in which the supplementary affidavits filed in these proceedings and the replies thereto can be relied on. This holds good for the officials of the DGCEI as well when called upon to defend those proceedings in accordance with law. (xii) The Court cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction and clarify the legal position as regards the interpretation of the scope and ambit of the powers under Sections 89, 90 and 91 of the FA. This is clearly within the powers of this Court. That is why this Court has decided to proceed with these petitions notwithstanding that the criminal petitions may be pending in the criminal jurisdiction of this Court. (xiii) The Court is satisfied that in the present case the action of the DGCEI in proceeding to arrest Mr. Pallai, Vice-President of MMT, was contrary to law and that Mr. Pallai‘s constitutional and fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution have been violated. The Court is conscious that Mr. Pallai has instituted separate proceedings for quashing of the criminal case and, therefore, this Court does not propose to deal with that aspect of the matter [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mala Devi Versus The State Govt. Of NCT Of Delhi And Ors., W.P.(C) 7178 of 2012,  Judgment Dated: 18.09.2014, Bench: Vibhu Bakhru, JJ, Delhi High Court- Consumer Laws- Medical Negligence- Issue, the Petition claiming compensation for a sum of 35,50,000/- to bring up her third child who is alleged to have been born because of medical negligence on the part of the doctors in performing the sterilization operation on the petitioner. The petitioner has further claimed an additional sum of `25,00,000/- Held, "12. In view of the above, an unsuccessful sterilization procedure does not necessarily imply that the attending doctors were negligent. As stated earlier, the contention that no procedure had been carried on by the doctors on petitioner’s right side fallopian tube is also not clearly established in given facts. 13. The petitioner had unequivocally agreed that she would not be entitled to file any suit for any compensation other than under the Family Planning Insurance Scheme. It was also clearly stated in the consent form that she would not seek compensation for maintenance of the child. In view of her accepting the terms for the operation conducted by respondent no.2, the claim for petitioner for upbringing a child or for compensation on account of failure of the sterilization procedure cannot be entertained in these proceedings. However, the petitioner would be entitled to a sum of `20,000/- under the Family Planning Insurance Scheme of respondent no.1. 14. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs." [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mamta Jaiswal Vs. Rajesh Jaiswal- Civil Revision No. 1290 of 1999- MPHC-24.03.2000- Held, "well qualified wife is not entitled to remain as an idle and claim maintenance from her husband” [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • Maneka Gandhi-SC-25.01.1978- Quashing- Legislation- Writ Petition No. 231 of 1977- (1978) 1 SCC 248= 1978 AIR 597= 1978 SCR (2) 621- Art-14, 19, 21- procedure in Article 21 means procedure which conforms to principles of natural justice - power conferred under Section 10 (3) (c) of Passports Act, 1967 not unguided and it is implied in it that rules of natural justice would be applicable - Held, Section 10 (3) (c) not violative of Article 21- Right of dignity - right to live is not merely confined to physical existence - it includes within its ambit right to live with human dignity- Principle of reasonableness provided under Article 14 must apply to procedure as contemplated under Article 21 - Article 21 controlled by Article 19 also - in case a law does not infringe Article 21 even then it has to meet challenges of Articles 14 and 19- Post-decisional hearing - petitioner's passport impounded and not given pre-decisional notice and hearing - Government contended that rule audi alteram partem must be excluded because it may have frustrated very purpose of impounding passport - concept of post-decisional hearing developed to maintain balance between administrative efficiency and fairness to individual - Court stressed that fair opportunity of being heard following immediately Order impounding passport would satisfy mandate of natural justice- Personal liberty- Whether right to go abroad is part of personal liberty-Whether a law which Complies with Article 21 has still to meet the challenge of Article 19-Nature and ambit of Article 14-Judging validity with reference to direct and inevitable effect-Whether the right under Article 19(1) (a) has any geographical limitation. Passports Act, 1967-Ss. 3,5,6,10(3)(c), 10(5)-Whether s.10(3)(c) is violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (a) (b) & 21-Grounds for refusing to grant passport-Whether the power to impound passport arbitrary-"in general public interest" if vague. Principles of Natural Justice-Whether applies only to quasi judicial orders or applies to administrative orders affecting rights of citizens-When statute silent whether can be implied-Duty to act judicially whether can be spelt out-In urgent cases whether principles of natural justice can apply. [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • Mangat Ram Vs. State of Haryana- Criminal Appeal No. 696 Of 2009-SC-27.03.2014- (2014) 12 SCC 595- S-498A- S-304B IPC- S-306 IPC-S- Exception IV to S-300 IPC- 113B- Indian Evidence Act (IEA)- Held, the mere fact that a married woman committed suicide within a period of 7 years of her marriage would not straightway attract the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA)- Further held, the presumption as regards dowry death was triggered only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry by the accused and that too with reasonable contributory to death [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mange Ram Jain & Ors. Represented By: Versus Jatinder Kumar Jain, Crl.M.C. 3768 of 2012, Judgment Dated: 07.10.2016, Bench: Mukta Gupta, J, Delhi  High Court/ Supreme Court Of India- Quashing- Summoning Order- Temporary disconnection of water supply line does not fall U/S-430 & 506 IPC [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mangesh Balkrushna Bhoir Versus. Sau. Leena Mangesh Bhoir- Civil Appellate Jurisdiction- Second Appeal No. 634 Of 2013, Judgment Dated: 23.12.2015, R.D. Dhanuka, J, Bombay High Court- The Divorce Sought & Granted By Trial Court, Under Section 13(1) (I-A)- The Appellate Court Reversed The Decree Passed By The Trial Court- The High Observed As Follows: “If The Wife Had Filed A False Case Against The Husband And His Family Members In Which The Appellant Husband And His Family Members Are Acquitted, It Amounted To Cruelty And The Husband On The Said Ground Was Entitled To Seek Divorce” [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia & Anr. Vs. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & Ors.- Criminal Appeal No.  1577   OF 2012- SC- 01.10.2012- (2012) 10  SCC  517- S-156(3), S-203 CrPC- Criminal Revision- Whether a suspect is entitled for hearing by the revisional court in a revision preferred by the complainant challenging the order of the Magistrate dismissing   the   complaint   under   Section   203   of   the   Cr.P.C. [Full Pdf Judgment].
    • Manik Taneja Versus State of Karnatka, Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2015, Judgment Dated: 20/01/2015, Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, J. & R. Banumathi J., Supreme Court Of India, Citation: 2015(1) JT 237: 2015(1) SCALE 484: 2015(1) SLT 657: 2015 CrLJ 1483: 2015(1) Crimes 221(SC): 2015(2) JCC 926: 2015(7) SCC 423: 2015(2) Supreme 121- Penal Code, 1860- Sections 353 & 506- Quashing of FIR- Lack of ingredients of alleged offences in complaint, justified- FIR against appellants under Sections 353 and 506 IPC for posting of a comment on Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing Inspector, Traffic Police Station, of his misbehaviour and also forwarded an email complaining about harassment meted out to them at hands of Respondent Police Inspector- Petition for quashing of said FIR- Held, page created by traffic police on Facebook was a forum for public to put forth their grievances- Appellants might have posted comment online under bona fide belief that it was within permissible limits- Even going by uncontroverted allegations in FIR, none of ingredients of alleged offences are satisfied- It would be unjust to allow process of court to be continued against appellants and consequently the order of High Court liable to be set aside- Petition allowed and FIR registered against appellants quashed- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 482- Quashing of FIR- Lack of ingredients of alleged offences, effect of- Cyber Laws- Online complaint (Para 12, 14, 15, 16 & 17)- HELD: Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant. By perusing the materials available on record, it appears that no force was used by the appellants to commit such an offence. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellants either assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the second respondent from discharging his official duty. Taking the uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are not made out (Para 12)- A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do (Para 14)- Allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC (Para 15) [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Maniram Sharma Versus CPIO & Scientist “D” M/o Communication & IT National Informatics Centre, RTI Division, File No. CIC/BS/A/2012/001725, Judgment Dated: 16.12.2015, M. S. ACHARYULU, IC, YASHOVARDHAN AZAD, IC, & BASANT SETH, IC, Central Information Commission- Email IDs of all Government officials cannot be provided [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar- Civil Appeal No.2500 Of 2017 - SC-14.07.2017- Domestic relationship must before allowing occupation of Shared house hold [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Ors.- Writ Petition (Criminal) 191 Of 2017- SC-28.11.2017 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manohar Lal Sharma, Vs. The Principal Secretary & Ors.- Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 120 Of 2012- SC- 25.08.2014- Mineral Law- The allocation of coal blocks made during the above period by the Central Government, according to petitioners, is illegal and unconstitutional inter alia on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance of the mandatory legal procedure under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, ‘1957 Act’). 3 (b) Breach of Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 (for short, ‘CMN Act’). (c) Violation of the principle of Trusteeship of natural resources by gifting away precious resources as largesse. (d) Arbitrariness, lack of transparency, lack of objectivity and non-application of mind; and (e) Allotment tainted with mala fides and corruption and made in favour of ineligible companies tainted with mala fides and corruption [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manoj Kumar Vs. Champa Devi- Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).10137/2015- SC-06.04.2017- Matrimonial- Maintenance- Desertion- Adultery [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manoj Kumar Sharma & Ors. Versus State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 775 Of 2013, Judgment Dated: 23.08.2016, Bench: Madan B. Lokur & R.K. Agrawal, JJ, Supreme Court Of India- Issue, extraordinary delay in lodging the FIR. The Petitioner averred, the FIR suffers from the following: an afterthought; coloured version or exaggerated story; raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations, which are, in any case, general in nature; reckless and vague allegations; wife has tried to rope the appellants in criminal proceedings. Held, “22) In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same  do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the appellants herein. Further, to invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court must be fully satisfied that the material produced on record is based on sound, justifiable and reasonable facts. In the case on hand, malicious prosecution was instituted by the brother of the deceased after a period of five years that too on the basis of anonymous letters. There was no accusation against the appellants before filing of the FIR. The allegations are vague and do not warrant continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellant. Also, the court at Durg has no territorial jurisdiction because cause of action, if any, has arisen in Ambala. The criminal proceeding is grossly delayed and a result of belated afterthought. The High Court failed to apply the test whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie, establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. The High Court did not apply its mind judiciously and on an incorrect appreciation of record, ordered for continuance of the investigation on a petition under Section 482 of the Code. This power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manoj-Sharma-Vs.-State-Ors.-Criminal-Appeal-No.-1619-OF-2008- Quashing- Amicable Settlement- [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manoranjana Singh Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation- Criminal Appeal No.  240   Of 2017-SC-05.02.2017-  (2017) 5 SCC 218- - Bail in PMLA, ED, and Analogous Crimes [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manpreet Verma Vs. Brij Verma - First Appeal No. 133 of 2017- UttHC- 14.06.18 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Manubhai Ratilal Patel Ushaben Vs. State of Gujarat- Criminal Appeal No. 1572 Of 2012-SC-28.09.2012- AIR 2013 SC 313 Detenu- detainee- Arestee-Confinee- Police Custody [PC]- Judicial Custody [JC]- S-167(2) CrPC- Art-21 of the Constitution- Detention beyond 60 days [Full PDF Judgment
    • Manu Sharma Vs NCT of Delhi-Criminal Appeal No. 179 Of 2007-SC-19.04.2010- 2010- 6 SCC 1- AIR 2001 SC 2352 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Maria Margarida Sequeirafernandes V. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira- Civil Appeal No.2968 Of 2012- SC-21.03.2012- (2012) 5 SCC 370- - O-XXXIX, R-1 & 2-Ex Parte Injunction [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Marguerite Chawla Vs. Kiran Abnashi Chawla- CS (OS) 2951 Of 2014- DelHC-05.10.2015- CPC- O-XII, R-6- Specific Relief Act, 1963- Section 6- Recovery of possession- Decree on admissions--Scope of- Suit for recovery of possession- Plaintiff was in possession of the property all along but has been surreptitiously dispossessed- Suit has been filed before the expiry of 6 months from the date of dispossession- Plaintiff was in constructive and legal possession of the suit property- Legal possession entails a right to possession- Having been deprived of her legal possession she is entitled under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, to recovery of its possession and restoration of status quo ante- Suit is decreed [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. Versus Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Transfer Pricing Officer New Delhi, W.P. (C) 6876/2008, Judgment Dated: 01/07/2010, Bench: Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.: V.K. Jain, J., Delhi High Court, Citation: 2010(10) AD(Delhi) 483: 2010(328) ITR 210.- Income Tax Act, 1961- Sections 92 to 92-F- Automobile Laws Involving The Income Tax Act- International transaction- Determination of arm's length price by Transfer Pricing Officer [TPO]- Use of foreign trademark/logo by domestic entity- Justification- Petitioner launched a car using logo `S' of Suzuki alongwith its own logo `M'- Grant of licence by Suzuki in respect of- Admittedly, petitioner was not a distributor for product manufactured by Suzuki- It was a licensed manufacturer of these products and had entered into a long term agreement with Suzuki- Therefore, no justification for TPO insisting upon payment by Suzuki to Maruti merely on account of use trademark/logo of Suzuki on products manufactured and sold by Maruti- Order passed by TPO making adjustment to income of  the company is based on no evidence which amounts to an error of law by him- The procedure followed by him is faulty, the approach adopted by him was erroneous and order passed is arbitrary and irrational- Impugned order of TPO unsustainable and hence set aside with directions to TPO to determine appropriate arm's length price afresh.- HELD: We see no justification for the TPO insisting upon payment by Suzuki to Maruti, merely on account of use of the name and/or logo of Suzuki on the products and parts manufactured and sold by Maruti. It is Maruti which felt the necessity of use of Suzuki's brand name and logo and that necessity was recognized by the Government of India, by approving the agreement between Maruti and Suzuki. We cannot agree with the TPO that Maruti had become a super brand and, therefore, the petitioner Company did not need to use Suzuki brand name and logo on its products. As noted earlier, on account of liberalization of the economy and de-licensing of the automobile industry, a number of foreign automobile majors had entered India or were contemplating entering the Indian market. Maruti, therefore, was not unjustified in concluding that it was necessary for it to enter into an agreement of this nature with Suzuki, so that it could meet the increased competition, posed to it on account of entry of these foreign majors, by using the brand name and logo of Suzuki on its products, besides obtaining the technical upgradation, augmentation and assistance from Suzuki. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that Suzuki being an international player, particularly in the segment of small cars, it was in a position to offer newer and better models to Maruti and use of the brand name and logo of Suzuki, therefore, was likely to be beneficial for the business interests of the petitioner. In any case, we can find no objection to the business decision taken by Maruti in this regard.- It would be noteworthy here that it was not obligatory for Maruti to use the logo of Suzuki on the products manufactured and sold by it in India, though Maruti in its discretion could use that logo, on those products as well- If we accept the contention that a foreign entity must necessarily pay to the domestic entity, which is an Associate Enterprise, on account of use of its trademark and logo even where using such trademark/logo is not obligatory for the Indian entity, that would result in the owner of every foreign trademark undertaking making payment to the domestic entity approaching it for use of its trademark and/or logo for the purpose of taking advantage of that reputed, trademark and/or logo on its products. This will result in a situation where, on the one hand, the Indian entity is paying to the foreign entity for use of its trademark/logo, and, on the other hand, it is simultaneously getting paid for carrying that trademark or logo on its products though it is the Indian entity and not the foreign entity which wants the use of the foreign trademark on the products manufactured and sold in India. If that happens, the owners of foreign trademarks may not be willing to permit use of their trademarks/logos by a domestic entities on the products manufactured and sold in India, unless they are more keen than the domestic entities in this regard- The TPO took the view that the value of the trademark 'Maruti' which, by the time Maruti entered into this agreement with Suzuki, had become a super brand, got diminished and correspondingly the value of the brand 'Suzuki' which was hitherto unknown in India appreciated on account of Maruti deciding to use the logo 'S' in place of the logo 'M' and use of the brand name 'Maruti Suzuki' in place of brand name 'Maruti' on the advertisements and promotions undertaken by Maruti. We, however, do not find ourselves to be in agreement with the TPO in this regard. As noted earlier, despite Maruti being a well-known brand of passenger car in the domestic market and only a few people in India being aware of the brand name 'Suzuki' at the time of Maruti entering into the agreement with Suzuki, the fact remains that on account of the increased competition, consequent upon the entry of multinationals selling vehicles under reputed and well established brand names, Maruti felt that it did require to use a reputed international brand name/logo in order to meet the competition. It is quite probable that had Maruti not used the name and logo of Suzuki, it might not have been able to face the competition given by these major auto players and would have lost its market share to them. Maruti instead of using the brand trademark of Suzuki, agreed to sell its products under a joint trademark which enabled it to preserve and promote its own brand while simultaneously taking advantage of the reputation associated with the name and logo of Suzuki, which admittedly was a reputed international brand in the automobile industry. In the joint trademark also the name Maruti comes before the name 'Suzuki', thereby giving an edge to the domestic trademark. In fact, the benefit from association of a reputed foreign name and logo may in such a case outweigh the loss, if any, in the value of the domestic brand. The test again, to our minds, would be as to what a comparable independent entity placed in the position of Maruti would have done in this regard. There was no material before the TPO from which it could be inferred that Maruti would have been able to achieve the growth which it was able to achieve even if it had not used the name 'Suzuki' in the joint trademark or had not used the logo of Suzuki- But, under the Agreement dated 12.12.1992 Maruti is under a contractual obligation to use the joint trademark 'Maruti Suzuki' on all the vehicles as well as the parts manufactured and/or sold by Maruti in India. We fail to understand any logic behind Suzuki insisting upon compulsory use of this joint trademark by Maruti, on all its products and parts, rather than leaving such use to the discretion of Maruti, except that Suzuki wanted to popularize its name in India at the cost of Maruti. Compulsory use of the trademark even when the domestic entity does not require it indicates benefit to the non-resident entity in the form of brand building in the domestic market by its display and use on the product as well as its packaging- There is no justification for apportioning the advertising and promotion expenses between a domestic entity and the foreign entity, even if they happen to be Associate Enterprises, merely on account of use of the name and/or logo of the foreign entity in the promotional and marketing activities, unless it is shown that the expenditure incurred on such activities was disproportionate and the benefit which accrued to the foreign entity in the form of increased awareness of its brand in the domestic market was not merely incidental. Mere use of a foreign brand, name and/or logo by an Associate Enterprise in the advertising and promotional activities undertaken by it, therefore, does not by itself entail payment by the owner of the foreign brand name and logo, and the question would always be as to whether a comparable independent entity would have incurred such expenditure or not- The use of the joint trademark has to be viewed in the context that any promotion or advertising of the product would also necessarily carry that joint trademark thereby bringing benefit in the form of marketing intangible to the foreign entity. There will be no justification for apportionment of the cost incurred on promotion and marketing where the use of such a joint trademark is discretionary and not obligatory or where the expenses incurred on marketing promotion and advertising do not exceed the expenditure which a comparable independent entity is expected to incur under these heads. But, this would become relevant where the use of a joint trademark of this nature is obligatory and the expenses incurred by the domestic entity on promotion and advertising exceed the normal expenses, which an independent entity would incur in this regard- Maruti, admittedly, was not a distributor for the products manufactured by Suzuki. It was a licensed manufacturer of these products and had entered into a long-term agreement with Suzuki. Therefore, it was justified in incurring substantial expenditure on marketing, promotion and advertising of its products even under the joint trademark 'Maruti Suzuki' and using the logo of Suzuki. Since the products promoted and advertised by Maruti were being manufactured and sold solely by it and Suzuki had no right to sell any product under the joint trademark 'Maruti Suzuki', the benefits from the expenditure incurred on marketing, promotion and advertising of Maruti products under the joint trademark 'Maruti Suzuki' would accrue to Maruti and the status of Maruti is, therefore, not comparable to that of a distributor or a licensed seller- Even if it is found that Maruti had incurred expenditure on marketing, promotion and advertising of its products, which was more than what a comparable independent entity, placed in the position of Maruti would have incurred, that by itself will not entail payment from Suzuki to Maruti if it is shown that under the terms and conditions of the composite agreement dated 12.12.1992, or some other arrangement, Maruti obtained some concession or subsidy from Suzuki, in one form or the other which can offset the extra expenditure incurred by Maruti on marketing, promotion and advertising of its products. As we said earlier, the TPO has to take an overall view of all the rights obtained and obligations incurred by Maruti, vis-a-vis, Suzuki and then determine appropriate arm's length price in respect of the international transactions which Maruti had with Suzuki- Since we have come to the conclusion that the order passed by the TPO making adjustments to the income of the petitioner company is based on no evidence which amounts to an error of law by him, the procedure followed by him was faulty, the approach adopted by him was erroneous and the order passed by him is arbitrary and irrational, it will be open to this Court to set aside the order passed by him, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Also, the Transfer Pricing Provisions being rather new to the tax regime in India and with the entry of more and more multinationals in our country, these provisions are likely to come up frequently for application by the TPOs as well as the Assessing Officers, we deem it appropriate to clarify those aspects of the transfer pricing provisions which come up for our consideration in this case, so that they are able to appreciate the scope of their powers under Transfer Pricing Provisions of the Act as well as the procedure to be followed and approach to be adopted by them while processing such cases- For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, the impugned order dated 30.10.2008 is hereby set aside and the TPO is directed to determine appropriate arm's length price in respect of the international transactions entered into by the petitioner Maruti Suzuki India Limited with Suzuki Motor Corporation, Japan, in terms of the provisions contained in Section 92C of the Income Tax Act and in the light of the observations made and the view taken by us in this order. The TPO shall determine the arm's length price within three months of the passing of this order [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Masjid, Shahid Ganj V SGP Committee, Air 1940 Pc 116 [Full PDF Judgment]
    • Mattel, Inc. & Anr Vs. Ms. Aman Bijal Mehta & Ors- DHC- 22.11.2017- CS(COMM) 803/2017, IA No.13724/2017- CPC- O-XXXIX, R-1 & 2- Grant Of Ex Parte Injunction- Public Interest- Held, “31. Though traditionally grant of orders under Order XXXIX Rules 1&2 of the CPC was governed by the elements of prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience only but it is settled law that an interim order can also be refused if the same is not found to be in public interest.” [Full PDF Judgments]. 
    • Maturi Pullaiah And Anr. Vs Maturi Narasimham And Ors. On 1 March, 1966-Air 1966 Sc 1836- Registration Of Family Settlement, When A Must [Full Pdf Judgment].
    • Mayur Sunil Bagul Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.- Writ Petition No. 9806 OF 2014 - BomHC - 04.10.2017 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Medical Council of India Vs. G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust- SC-23.11.2017- Civil Appeal No.19662 OF 2017- Judge- A Judge is expected to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered from subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions. A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a categorical imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to take justice to her coffin [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • M.Chinna Karuppasamy Vs. Kanimozhi- CRL.RC.(MD)No.142 of 2012- MadHC-16.07.2015-Matrimonial laws- Maintenance- Wife & Children- Adultery- Adulterous wife not entitled for maintenance    [Full PDF Judgment].
    • MCI- Medical Council Of India Vs.  Dr Anil Grover & Ors .- LPA 577 Of  2017-DelHC-27.10.2017 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union of India, WP-C-4677 of 1985-SC-18.12.1998 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) 4677 of 1985- SC-16.02.2006, Bench: Y.K. Sabharwal, B.N. Srikrishna & R.V. Raveendran, JJ, Supreme Court OF India, Citation: (2007) 1 SCC 110 - In respect of  flagrant violations of various laws including Municipal Laws, Master Plan and other plans besides Environmental Laws- Petition filed with a view to secure the implementation of laws and various orders, as also to protect fundamental rights of the citizens [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition- Civil- No.-4677 of 1985- SC-06.03.2018- Stay on Delhi Master Plan [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition- Civil- No.-4677 of 1985- SC-15.05.2018- Removal of stay on Delhi Master Plan [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition- Civil- No.-4677 of 1985- SC-24.05.2018- SC disallows Attorney General’s oral request of reducing the notice period of inviting suggestion/ objections to the proposed amendments to the Delhi Master Plan. The Hon’ble Supreme Court stuck to order dated 15.05.2018, wherein the whole procedure to be adopted was exhaustively laid down [Full PDF Judgment].   
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union of India, WP(C) No. 4677/1985, Judgment Dated- 29/09/2006, Bench: Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J.: C.K. Thakker, J.: R.V. Raveendran, J., Supreme Court Of India, Citation: 2006(Supp-6) SCR 704: 2006(7) SCC 456: 2006(12) JT 351: 2006(9) SCALE 634: 2006(7) Supreme 508: 2006(10) SRJ 583: 2006(3) JCC 1470: 2006(10) SCJD 75- Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006- Section 5- Constitutional validity of- Flagrant violation of municipal laws, town planning laws and environmental laws- Commercial activity in residential/non-conforming area of Delhi, a basis of Various orders of Court for stoppage of misuser and to seal premises in case of misuser- Direction by Central Government to Local Authorities to give effect to provision of Act, 2006- Writ petition challenging constitutional validity of Act- Writ admitted and rule issued by court- Certain direction also issued by court in respect of premises involved in misuser- Constitution of India- Articles 21, 48-A & 51-A(g)- Delhi Development Act, 1957- Sections 12, 11-A & 31-A- Words and Phrases- Small shops.- HELD: In the background of the above facts and having considered the submissions made, we issue the following directions: (i) Re : Premises relating to which undertakings were given- The commercial activities by those who gave undertakings deserve to be stopped forthwith. Having regard, however, to the plea of forthcoming major festivals, we permit those who gave undertakings to stop misuser on or before 31st October, 2006.- (ii) Re : Small Shops- Small Shops, i.e., measuring not more than 20 sq. mts. in residential areas are allowed trading in the following items: i. Vegetables/fruits/flowers; ii. Bakery items/confectionary items; iii. Kirana/General stores; iv. Dairy products; v. Stationery/Books/Gifts/Book binding; vi. Photostat/Fax/STD/PCO; vii. Cyber cafe/Call phone booths; viii. LPG Booking office/Show room without LPG cylinders; ix. Atta chakki; x. Meat/Poultry and Fish shop; xi. Pan shop; xii. Barber shop/Hair dressing saloon/Beauty Parlour; xiii. Laundry/Dry cleaning/ironing; xiv. Sweet shops/Tea stall without sitting arrangements; xv. Chemist shops; xvi. Optical shops; xvii. Tailoring shops; xviii. Electrical/Electronic repair shop; and- xix. Photo studio- xx. Cable TV/DTH Operations- xxi. Hosiery/Readymade Garments/Cloth shops-xxii. ATM- (iii) Re : Other premises for which protection is extended by Notification dt. 7.9.2006- Regarding the remaining premises which may be covered by the Notification dated 7th September, 2006 read with 15th September, 2006, we direct that the said premises may not be sealed pending decision of these petitions on undertakings being filed before the Monitoring Committee on or before 10th November, 2006 that misuser shall be stopped as per the directions of this Court if the Act is invalidated and/or the Notification is quashed. Further, the undertakings shall state that the trade is being conducted in respect of the permissible items and only in that part of the premises in which commercial activity is now permitted as per the impugned Notification dated 7th September, 2006 read with Notification dated 15th September, 2006, viz. if commercial activity has been made permissible on the ground floor, the affidavit shall state that it is being carried out only in the ground floor and not on the other floors and in support a certificate of the registered Architect shall be annexed. Any Architect giving wrong certificate would subject himself to appropriate action including cancellation of certificate to carry on the profession of Architect.- (iv) Re : Premises for which protection is not extended by Notification dated 7.9.2006- In respect of the remaining premises not covered by the Notifications dated 7th September, 2006 and 15th September, 2006, the sealing process will continue in terms of the Order dated 16th February, 2006 and 10th August, 2006. The direction of sealing premises will also apply to specific properties mentioned in the judgment dated 16th February, 2006 and in the Report of the Monitoring Committee dated 14th September, 2006. The sealing would be done in a systemic manner as per directions of Monitoring Committee and not in a haphazard manner. There shall be no misuser of public land or public street. The authorities shall ensure that the Roads, Public Streets and pathways meant for public is kept free for their use and the commercial activity is not extended thereupon. The commercial user in contravention of judgment in M.C. Mehta's case (supra), order dated 10th August, 2006 and Notifications dated 7th September, 2006 and 15th September, 2006 subject to what is stated in this order shall be liable to be sealed.- (v) General Directions: (a) We direct that the owner/occupier of small shops and also others who have been permitted to continue and not stop commercial activity for the present, under this order shall get themselves registered upto 31st December, 2006.- (b) In respect of the premises which have been sealed under the orders of this Court, we permit them to approach the Monitoring Committee which will consider each case on its merit and make appropriate report to this Court on consideration whereof necessary directions may be issued.- (c) The respondents are restrained from issuing any other Notification for conversion of residential user into commercial user except with the leave of this Court.- (d) We also hope that without any further loss of time the Government and the concerned authorities, instead of ad hoc measures like the present, would now undertake proper planning keeping into consideration all relevant factors including the interests of those residents which may not have any voice.- (e) Before concluding, we may note the grievance placed before us on behalf of professionals including Doctors, Lawyers, Chartered Accountants and Architects in respect of the Notification dated 7th September, 2006. Relying upon notifications dated 27th November, 1998 and 7th June, 2000 and Press Release dated 27th November, 1998, they say that restrictions sought to put in the Notification dated 7th September, 2006 were not there earlier and may be restrictions have been put by inadvertence. Mrs.Indira Jaisingh, appearing for Government of India says that she will have it examined by the Government and, if required, necessary correction will be made [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) 13381 Of 1984,  Judgment Dated: 27.11.2006, Bench: S.B. Sinha, S.H. Kapadia & D.K. Jain, JJ, Supreme Court OF India, Citation: (2007) 1 SCC 110- Taj Corridor Scam- In Supreme Court monitored cases, this Court is concerned with ensuring proper and honest performance of its duty by CBI and that this Court is not concerned with the merits of the accusations in investigation, which are to be determined at the trial on the filing of the charge-sheet in the competent court, according to the ordinary procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, the question which we have to decide in the present case is whether the administrative hierarchy of officers in the CBI, in the present case, have performed their duties in a proper and honest manner.- Whether on the facts and the circumstance of this case, the Director, CBI, who has not given his own independent opinion, was right in referring the matter for opinion to the Attorney General of India, particularly when the entire investigation and law officers’ team was ad idem in its opinion on filing of the charge-sheet and only on the dissenting opinion of the Director of Prosecution, whose opinion is also based on the interpretation of the legal evidence, which stage has not even arrived. The opinion of the Director, CBI is based solely on the opinion of the Attorney General after the reference.- It is beyond any doubt or dispute that investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police. It may be subject to supervision of higher ranking officer (s) but the court’s jurisdiction to have control in this behalf is beyond any controversy.- Section 5 of Cr.P.C shows that all offences shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with in accordance with the Code.- Under the Code, investigation consists of proceeding to the spot, ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, collection of evidence and formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial, and if so, taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 173.- The scheme of the Code, as provided in Section 168 of the Code,  shows that while it is permissible for an officer in charge of a police station to depute some subordinate officer to conduct some of these steps in the investigation, the responsibility for each one of the above steps is that of the officer in charge of the police station (SHO)- The SHO however can not delegation the function regarding formation of the opinion- Section 36 of the Code only entitles the superior officers to supervise.- A police report which results from an investigation as provided for in Section 190 of the Code is the material on which cognizance is taken. But from that it cannot be said that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance.-  The manner and the method of conducting the investigation are left entirely to the officer in charge of the police station. A Magistrate has no power to interfere with the same. The formation of the opinion whether there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the case to a Magistrate or not, as contemplated by Sections 169 and 170, is to be that of the officer in charge of the police station and a Magistrate has absolutely no role to play at this stage.- There is a clear-cut and well-demarcated sphere of activities in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation. It is obliged to prevent crime. If an offence is committed allegedly, it is the State’s duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates through the police department and finds an offence having been committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the purposes of proving the offence. Once that is completed, the investigating officer submits report to the court requesting the court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 Cr.PC and his duty comes to an end.- Whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial, should be that of the officer in charge of the police station and none else. Under the CBI Manual, the officer in charge of the police station is the S.P.- In the present case, the investigating team consisted of the I.O., S.P., D.I.G., Joint Director and Additional Director CBI. In the present case, the law officers consisted of D.L.A. and A.L.A.. In the present case, the entire investigating team as well as the said law officers are ad idem in their mind. They have recommended prosecution. It is only the Director of Prosecution and the Sr. P.P. who have opined that a closure report should be filed. It may be noted that Sr. P.P. does not find place in clause 6.1 which refers to the administrative hierarchy of CBI.- Keeping in mind the scheme of Sections 168, 169, 170 and 173 of the Cr.PC, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the SC directed the entire material collected by CBI along with the report of the S.P. to be placed before the concerned court/ Special Judge in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.PC.- Under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court is empowered to take aid and assistance of any Authority for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.- In the present case, at one stage of the matter, voluminous records were placed by CBI before this Court along with the recommendations of its officers. To vet and analyse the material, this Court essentially directed CVC to study the material, analyse the findings and give its recommendations as to the manner in which the investigations have been carried out.- “ The efficacy and ethics of the governmental authorities are progressively coming under challenge before this Court by way of PIL for failure to perform their statutory duties. If this continues, a day might come when the rule of law will stand reduced to "a rope of sand" [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union Of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) 13381 Of 1984,  Judgment Dated: 10.10.2007, Bench: S.B. Sinha, S.H. Kapadia & D.K. Jain, JJ, Supreme Court OF India, Citation: (2007) 1 SCC 110- Taj Corridor Scam- Issue of sanction U/S-197 Of Cr.P.C. for prosecution of Ms. Mayawati & Naseemuddin Siddiqui, the then Minister of Environment, U.P.-  Held, "13....while entertaining a public interest litigation in a given case, this Court may exercise a jurisdiction to set aside the decision of a constitutional authority.... If no sanction of the Governor was required or if he has committed an error in passing the said order, the appropriate court, in our opinion, would be entitled to deal therewith, but not this Bench."Madras Bar Association Versus Union Of India And Another, Transferred Case (C) No. 150 Of 2006 Judgment Dated: 25.09.2014, Bench: R.M. Lodha, CJI, Jagdish Singh Khehar, J, J. Chelameswar, J, A K Sikri, J,  R.F. Nariman, J, Supreme Court Of India- Issue of the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005, as also a challenge to section 46 of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 323B of Constitution of India. contending, inter alia, that section 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, is ultra vires the basic structure of the Constitution as it enables proliferation of Tribunal system and makes serious inroads into the independence of the judiciary by providing a parallel system of administration of justice, further contending that Article 323B violates the basic structure of the Constitution as it completely takes away the jurisdiction of the High Courts and vests them in the National Tax Tribunal, including trial of offences and adjudication of pure questions of law, which have always been in the exclusive domain of the judiciary [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M.C. Mehta Versus Union of India, WP(C) 4677/1985, Judgment Dated- 18/12/1996, Citation: 1997(6) SCALE(SP) 14(1)- Bench- Kuldip Singh, J.: S. Saghir Ahmad, J.- Environmental Law - Public Parks - Misuse of - District park in Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi, under the control of MCD - Direction given to restore and improve the Park to its original position - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 - Section 397.Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund V. Kartick Das- ______- (1994) 4 SCC 225- O-XXXIX, R-1 & 2- Principles Succinctly Culled Out For Grant Of Ex Parte Injunction [Full PDF Judgments].
    • Medical Council Of India Versus. Christian Medical College Vellore & Ors., Review Petition (C)Nos.2159-2268 Of 2013 And Review Petition (C) NOS.2048-2157 OF 2013 IN TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NOS.98-105, 107-108,110-139, 142, 144-145 OF 2012 & 1-5, 7-25, 28-49, 53, 58-73, 75-76 & 107-108 OF 2013, Judgment Dated: 11.04.2016, Bench: Anil R. Dave, A.K. Sikri, R.K. Agrawal, Adarsh Kumar Goel, R.Banumathi, JJ, Supreme Court Of India- Vide this judgment, the judgment namely, “Christian Medical College Vellore & Ors. Versus Union Of India And Ors., T.C.(C) No.98 Of 2012, Judgment Dated: 18.07.2013, Bench: Altamas Kabir, CJI, Vikramajit Sen, Anil R. Dave, JJ, Supreme Court Of India (2014) 2 SCC 305” recalled [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Medical Council of India Vs. G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust- SC-23.11.2017- Civil Appeal No.19662 OF 2017- Judge- A Judge is expected to abandon his personal notion or impression gadered from subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions. A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a categorical imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to take justice to her coffin [Full PDF Judgments].
    • Meters And Instruments Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Kanchan Mehta- Criminal Appeal No. 1731 Of 2017-SC-05.10.2017- Cheque Bounce Case- 138 NI Act Cases- Compounding & Settlement- Directions issues [Full PDF Judgment]
    • Misrilal Ramratan & Ors. Mansukhlal & Ors. Vs. A. S. Shaik Fathimal- 1995 Supp (4) SCC 600- “It is now settled law that the report of the Commissioner is part of the record and that therefore the report cannot be overlooked or rejected on spacious plea of non-examination of the Commissioner as a witness since it is part of the record of the case.” [Full PDFJudgment]. 
    • M. Nagaraj Vs. Union Of India- 5JBSC-19.10.2006- Writ Petition (Civil)  61 of 2002- 3 (2006) 8 SCC 212= AIR 2007 SC 71- Service Law- Promotion- Reservation- Reservation in promotion- Articles 16(4), 16(4A) and 16(4B) of the Constitution of India- The width and amplitude of the right to equal opportunity in public employment, in the context of reservation, broadly falls for consideration in these writ petitions under Article of the Constitution [Full PDF Judgment].  
    • M.N. Ojha & Ors. v. Alok Kumar Srivastav & Anr.- Criminal Appeal No. 1582 Of 2009-Sc-21.08.2009- (2009) 9 SCC 682. Quashing- Complaint Case- In this case a complaint filed against the bank officials was quashed because the Court found that it was a counter-blast to action taken by them in their official capacity for realizing the loan amount due from the complainant [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo- (1988) 4 SCC 619 that in a case where the defense is struck off, there is nothing which precludes the parties from confronting a witness of the other party in cross examination with documents that are not on record [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mohammed Sultan Vs. State of Karnataka- KarHC-14.06.2018-Circumstantial Evidence- Confession- When hit by S-25 & S-27 of Evidence Act [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • Mohan Lal [Union of India Vs. Mohanlal]-Criminal Appeal No.652 OF 2012-SC-28.01.2016- Seizure, Sampling, Safe keeping and Disposal of the seized Drugs, Narcotics and Psychotropic substances  [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mohit Vs. Union of India and others - CWP No.5862 of 2016 - P&HHC - 16.11.2016 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Moin Akhtar Qureshi Versus UOI- DelHC-01.12.2017-W.P.(CRL) 2465 of 2017- Detainee- Arrestee- Confinee- PMLA-ED-FERA- Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India [Full PDF Judgment]. 
    • Motilal Vohra Vs. Subramanian Swamy & Others, Crl. MC 671 Of 201, Delhi High Court, Order dated 12.07.2016- Section- 91 Cr.P.C.- Summons to produce document or other thing [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Moti Ram Vs. State Of M.P.-SC-24.08.1978-1978 AIR 1594=1978 SCC (4) 47-Bail jurisprudence-Enlargement on bail with or without sureties-Scope of Ss. 440(1), 441, 445, 389(1)- Criteria to guide in quantifying the amount of bail and acceptance of surety whose estate is situate in a different district or State- ’Bail’ in s. 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code suggests ’with or without sureties. And, ’bail bond‘ in s. 436(2) covers own bond. Art. 14 protects all Indians qua Indians, within the territory of India. Art. 350 sanctions representation to any authority, including a Court, for redress of grievances in any language used in the Union of India. Equality before the law implies that even a vakalat or affirmation made in and State language according to the law in that State must be accepted everywhere in the territory of India, same where a valid legislation to the contrary exists. Otherwise, an Adivasi will be unfree in Free India, and likewise many other minorities. The process of making Indians aliens in their own homeland should be inhibited. Swaraj is made out of united stuff. The best guarantee of presence in Court is the reach of law, not the money tag- The Court left open to the Parliament to consider- whether in our socialist republic with social justice as its hallmark, monetary superstition, not other relevant consideration like family ties, roots in the community, membership of stable organisations should prevail or bail bonds to ensure that the ’bailee’ does not flee justice [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Moulasab Vs State of Karnataka-KarHC-11.06.2018- Over-speeding Not Necessary To Constitute Rash Driving [Full PDF Judgment].
    • M. Pentiah Vs. Muddala Veeramallappa- Civil Appeal No. 387 Of 1960-SC-07.11.1960- AIR 1961 SC 1107- Doctrine of Implied Powers of the Court- The very purpose of Code of Criminal Procedure in restricting Magisterial powers is to enable the accused to get a fair trial in any proceeding [Full PDF Judgment]
    • M. Sathiya Priya [Union Public Service Commission Vs. M. Sathiya Priya]- Civil Appeal No. 10854 Of 2014-SC-13.04.2018 [Full PDF Judgment]
    • M. S. Shoes East Ltd. Vs M.R.T.P- 2003 VIII AD (Delhi)- Even though no period of limitation was specified in Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, all claims thereunder had to be filed within a reasonable time, which was determined, in this case to be three years [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mukarrab Etc. Vs. State Of U.P.- Criminal Appeal Nos. 1119-1120 Of 2016 - Sc- 30.11.2016 [Full PDF Judgment]
    • Mukesh Jain Vs. CBI-  Bail Application No. 2179 Of 2009-DelHC-21.12.2009- [2010 (1) AD (Delhi) 443 [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mukesh Vs. State For NCT Of Delhi And Others- Criminal Appeal Nos. 607-608 Of 2017- SC-05.05.2017- Nirbhaya’s Case [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Mukesh Kumar  Vs. NDMC And Anr.- W.P.(C) 61 Of 2018- DelHC- 05.01.2018- Street Vendors Act, 2014- Town Vending Committee(TVC)- Merely because the petitioner is not found vending at the site when the survey is conducted, that by itself would not be a ground alone to reject his case [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Municipal Corporation, Ujjain Vs. BVG. India Limited- Civil Appeal No. 3330 Of 2018-3JSC-27.03.2018- Judicial Review- Vital Grounds of challenge- Unreasonableness, Irrationality, Arbitrariness, Bias & Malafide [PDF Judgment].
    • Municipal Council Ratlam Vs. Shri Vardichan and others- SC-29.07.1980-1980 (4) SCC 162= 1980 AIR 1622- Writ- Constitution of India- Art- 226 & 32- Basic Amenities- Water- Food- Road- Education- Electricity- Municipality not providing sanitary facilities  and construction of public conveniences for slum  dwellers-Whether Courts  can compel municipal body to carry  out its duty to the community to provide amenities and abate nuisance [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Muniswamy L [State Of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy] –3JBSC-03.03.1977- 1977 AIR 1489- 1977 SCC (2) 699- Framing of Charge- Discharge [Full PDF Judgment].
    • Munna- State Of Madhya Pradesh Vs Munna Alias Shambhoo Nath- Criminal Appeal No. 658 Of 2011- POCSO- Age determination [Full PDF Judgment].

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